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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In 1990, nineteen year old Tony Bennett was sitting in 
the passenger seat of a getaway car when his conspirator 
entered a jewelry store to commit a robbery, shooting the 
clerk and killing her.  Bennett was convicted of first degree 
murder.  After a capital sentencing hearing, the jury returned 
a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole.  Two state courts later vacated Bennett’s first degree 
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murder conviction, finding that the trial court erroneously 
instructed the jury that it could convict Bennett of first degree 
murder based on the shooter’s intent to kill.  Bennett never 
got relief; instead, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed.  
Before us is Bennett’s habeas corpus petition, asserting that 
the trial court’s erroneous jury instructions deprived him of 
due process of law under the United States Constitution.  
Applying de novo review, we agree and will grant the writ. 
 
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
 
 A. Trial and Sentencing 
 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court summarized the 
factual history of this case as follows: 
 
[Bennett] conspired with four 
individuals, Michael Mayo, Kecia 
Ray, Kevin Wyatt, and Paul 
Johnson, to rob a jewelry store in 
Philadelphia at gunpoint.  The 
store was selected because a 
salesperson, Ms. Ju Yang Lee, 
had made what the conspirators 
believed to be an insultingly low 
offer for a gold chain that Mayo 
and Johnson earlier had sought to 
pawn.  Appellee Bennett supplied 
the loaded gun, but did not enter 
the store, remaining in the 
getaway car with Wyatt.  Mayo 
and Johnson were caught on 
videotape entering and robbing 
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the store.  During the robbery, 
Mayo shot Ms. Lee with 
[Bennett]’s gun, killing her. 
  
Commonwealth v. Bennett (Bennett VI), 57 A.3d 1185, 1187 
(Pa. 2012).   
 
 Bennett proceeded to a jury trial on charges of murder, 
criminal conspiracy, possession of an instrument of crime, 
and robbery.  The Commonwealth charged murder generally, 
and the trial court instructed the jury on first, second, and 
third degree murder, as well as voluntary manslaughter.  The 
Commonwealth also charged conspiracy generally.  The trial 
court instructed the jury that the objective of the conspiracy 
was murder, robbery, possession of an instrument of crime, 
and a firearms offense. 
 
 Bennett was tried jointly with two other non-shooters, 
Johnson and Wyatt.  Johnson entered the jewelry store with 
the shooter.  Wyatt, like Bennett, remained in the getaway 
car.  Id.  The fourth non-shooter, Ray, testified for the 
Commonwealth and later received a lenient sentence.1  Mayo, 
the shooter, was initially on trial with Johnson and Wyatt, but 
during jury selection suffered “an acute psychotic episode” 
requiring hospitalization.  App. 284.  Mayo was declared 
incompetent after voir dire and his case severed. 
 Bennett was charged capitally.2  Under Pennsylvania 
law, the Commonwealth could only obtain a death sentence if 
                                              
 1  Ray was sentenced to fourteen to twenty-eight 
months’ incarceration and ten years’ probation. 
 
 2  So too were co-defendants Johnson and Wyatt. 
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the jury convicted Bennett of first degree murder.  See 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1102(a)(1).  Therefore, from the start of trial, 
a central issue was whether Bennett was guilty of this offense.  
See Bennett VI, 57 A.3d at 1204 n.12.  First degree murder in 
Pennsylvania requires that each defendant have the specific 
intent to kill.  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2502(a).  An accomplice or 
conspirator cannot be convicted of first degree murder based 
on the specific intent to kill of the principal.  See 
Commonwealth v. Huffman, 638 A.2d 961, 962 (Pa. 1994) 
(citing Commonwealth v. Bachert, 453 A.2d 931, 935 (Pa. 
1982)). 
 
 At Bennett’s trial, the Commonwealth never argued 
that Bennett had the specific intent to kill.  Rather, its theory 
was that he was guilty of first degree murder solely because 
he was an accomplice and conspirator of the shooter.  In the 
Commonwealth’s opening statement, the prosecutor told the 
jury that “lest you think I am crazy for saying [Bennett, 
Johnson and Wyatt] are guilty of first degree murder, when I 
told you that Michael Mayo fired the fatal shots . . . I will 
urge upon you that the law of conspiracy makes all of these 
defendants first degree murderers.”  App. 312-13.  In closing, 
the prosecutor argued that “accomplices are equally guilty 
with the principal.  First degree murder, intent to kill.  There 
is no doubt, there can be no doubt that [the shooter] Michael 
Mayo intended to kill [the victim]. . . . Co-conspirators and 
accomplices are equally guilty with the principal.”  App. 591-
92. 
 
 This argument—that an accomplice or conspirator is 
“equally guilty” of first degree murder—was incorrect as a 
matter of state law.  Nevertheless, the trial court echoed it in 
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its jury instructions.  Bennett’s petition turns on these jury 
instructions, and so we describe them in detail.   
 
 First, the trial court charged the jury on criminal 
conspiracy, in relevant part, as follows: 
 
Where two or more join in the 
commission of an unjustified 
assault which results fatally, all 
are guilty regardless of which one 
inflicts the mortal wounds.  When 
two or more combine to commit a 
felony or to make an assault, and 
in carrying out the common 
purpose another is killed, the one 
who enters into the combination 
but does not personally commit 
the wrongful act is equally 
responsible for the homicide as 
the one who directly causes it. 
 
. . . 
 
Such responsibility . . . extend[s] 
even to a homicide which is the 
consequence of the natural and 
probable execution of the 
conspiracy even though such 
homicide is not specifically 
contemplated by the parties.  
 
App. 602-03 (emphases added).   
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 In response to a jury question the trial court later 
repeated this instruction. 
 
 The trial court also instructed the jury on accomplice 
liability, in relevant part, as follows: “[O]ne may be legally 
accountable for conduct of another not only if he is a co-
conspirator, but also if he is an accomplice who aids and 
abets the commission of a crime.”  App. 603.  “The degree of 
concert or collusion between parties to an illegal transaction 
means the act of one is the act of all.”  App. 604 (emphasis 
added). 
 
 The trial court further instructed the jury on murder, 
beginning with this introduction: 
 
Each defendant comes before you 
charged with murder and 
voluntary manslaughter.  
 
Now on this bill, you may find 
each defendant guilty of murder 
in the first degree, guilty of 
murder in the second degree, or 
guilty of murder in the third 
degree, or guilty of voluntary 
manslaughter, or not guilty.   
 
App. 605.   
 
 Five paragraphs later, the trial court instructed the jury 
on first degree murder, which it defined as follows: 
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A criminal homicide constitutes 
murder of the first degree when it 
is committed by an intentional 
killing.  As used in this statute, 
intentional killing means among 
other things a willful, deliberate 
and premeditated killing.  
 
A killing is willful and deliberate 
if the defendant consciously 
decided to kill the victim and it is 
premeditated if the defendant 
possessed a fully-formed intent to 
kill at the time when he acted and 
though there need not have been 
any appreciable amount of time 
between the time when the 
defendant first conceived the idea 
of killing and the time when he 
acted. 
 
The design to kill can be 
formulated in a fraction of a 
second. 
 
In determining whether or not the 
defendants committed said kind of 
intentional killing required for 
first degree murder, you should 
consider the testimony of expert 
witnesses, as well as all other 
evidence which may shed light on 
what was going on in the 
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defendant’s mind at the time of 
the alleged killing. 
 
If a defendant intentionally uses a 
deadly weapon on a vital part of 
the body, you may infer from this 
that the killing was intentional.  
 
Specific intent as well as malice 
may be inferred from the use of a 
deadly weapon on a vital part of 
the body. 
 
App. 606-07.3 
 
 The jury convicted Bennett of first degree murder and 
related charges.4  A penalty hearing followed.  The 
                                              
 3  The trial court also instructed the jury on second 
degree murder, third degree murder and voluntary 
manslaughter.  In response to a jury question, the trial court 
read back the first, second and third degree murder 
instructions. 
 
 4  In addition to first degree murder, the jury convicted 
Bennett of conspiracy, possession of an instrument of crime 
and two counts of robbery.  The trial court granted a 
judgment of acquittal on a third robbery count.  Only the first 
degree murder conviction is at issue in Bennett’s habeas 
corpus petition.  See Laird v. Horn, 414 F.3d 419, 430 (3d 
Cir. 2005); Everett v. Beard, 290 F.3d 500, 516 (3d Cir. 
2002), abrogated on other grounds by Porter v. McCollum, 
558 U.S. 30 (2009). 
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Commonwealth sought the death penalty, despite stipulating 
that Bennett was nineteen years old at the time of the crime 
and had no significant criminal history.  After additional 
deliberation, the jury returned a sentence of life 
imprisonment.  On June 1, 1993, the trial court formally 
sentenced Bennett to life imprisonment without the possibility 
of parole.  Bennett VI, 57 A.3d at 1189.5 
 
 
 B. Post-Conviction Proceedings  
 
                                                                                                     
 
 5  The trial court imposed a life sentence for first 
degree murder.  It also sentenced Bennett to ten to twenty 
years’ imprisonment on each of the robbery counts, and two 
and half to five years’ imprisonment on possession of an 
instrument of crime.  It imposed a suspended sentence on 
conspiracy.  As to whether these sentences were to run 
concurrently or consecutively, this Court lacks the written 
sentencing order because the trial court did not provide the 
state court record.  According to the notes of testimony, the 
trial court stated orally, “on Bill 22 of July Term, 1990, 
charging you with first degree murder, I impose a sentence of 
life imprisonment, and on Bill 24 of July Term, 1900, I 
impose a sentence of 10 to 20 years to run concurrently.  Bill 
21 is the robbery bill of July Term, 1992.  I will impose a 
sentence of 10 to 20 years, to run consecutive to Bill 24 but 
also concurrent with the life term and on possession of 
instruments of crime, I will impose a two and a half to five 
year sentence also to run concurrently.”  App. Sentencing 
Tr. 20, June 1, 1993. 
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 Bennett did not file a direct appeal.  In 1995, he filed a 
pro se petition under the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief 
Act (PCRA), in which he asserted, inter alia, two claims 
relevant to this appeal.  First, Bennett asserted that the trial 
court violated his state and federal due process rights by 
instructing the jury that he could be convicted of first degree 
murder without the specific intent to kill.  Second, Bennett 
asserted that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object 
to the trial court’s erroneous jury instructions.6 
 
 In 1999, the trial court dismissed Bennett’s PCRA 
petition.  Bennett filed an appeal.  In 2000, the Superior Court 
dismissed the PCRA appeal because post-conviction counsel 
failed to file a brief.  Bennett subsequently filed a second 
PCRA petition seeking to reinstate his right to appeal his first 
PCRA petition. 
 
 Meanwhile, as Bennett’s PCRA was winding through 
the courts, his conspirator, Wyatt, reached the Superior Court 
on post-conviction proceedings.  Wyatt was the other man 
sitting with Bennett in the getaway car during the botched 
robbery.  See Bennett VI, 57 A.3d at 1187.  The two were 
tried and convicted together.  In 2001, the Superior Court 
granted Wyatt’s PCRA petition and vacated his first degree 
murder conviction.  The court found that that trial court’s jury 
instructions “improperly permitted the jury to find [Wyatt] 
guilty of first degree murder without evidence to support that 
finding,” and that counsel was ineffective for failing to object 
to the flawed charge.  Commonwealth v. Wyatt, No. 2050 
EDA 1999, *15, 782 A.2d 1061 (Pa. Super. Jul. 16, 2001) 
                                              
 6  Post-conviction counsel also filed an amended 
PCRA petition. 
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(table) (App. 228).  The Commonwealth sought allowance of 
appeal, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the 
petition.  Commonwealth v. Wyatt, No. 521 EAL 2001, 809 
A.2d 904 (Pa. Oct. 15, 2002) (table).  Wyatt later pled guilty 
to third degree murder, a lesser offense.  See Commonwealth 
v. Wyatt, 115 A.3d 876, 878 (Pa. Super. 2015); see also 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 1102(d), 2502(c). 
 
 Shortly after Wyatt won PCRA relief, the trial court 
reinstated Bennett’s right to appeal the denial of his PCRA 
petition.  Bennett appealed to the same Superior Court that 
had recently granted Wyatt’s petition.  In 2004, however, the 
en banc Superior Court denied relief on procedural grounds.  
It found that Bennett’s PCRA petition, through which the trial 
court had reinstated his appellate rights, was untimely.  
Commonwealth v. Bennett (Bennett I), 842 A.2d 953, 954 (Pa. 
Super. 2004) (en banc), vacated by Commonwealth v. Bennett 
(Bennett II), 930 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 2007).  In an opinion by 
now-Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Todd, the en banc 
Superior Court expressed its opinion of the merits in the 
strongest possible language:  
 
There is no question that Tony 
Bennett was entitled to a new 
trial: the accomplice liability 
charge given at his murder trial 
was erroneous, and his 
codefendant at trial was granted a 
new trial on that basis. . . . [N]o 
appellate court has yet addressed 
Bennett’s meritorious claim, 
apparently due to the serial 
ineffectiveness of counsel.  
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Bennett thus stands convicted of 
first-degree murder, and 
sentenced to life imprisonment, 
based on an erroneous accomplice 
liability charge, for a killing 
which occurred when his co-
conspirators robbed a jewelry 
store while he waited in the 
getaway car. 
 
Bennett I, 842 A.2d at 954.   
 
 The Superior Court further opined that “there is no 
doubt that there is merit to this claim,” id. at 956, that 
“Bennett has been denied appellate review of a clearly 
meritorious issue,” id. at 957, and that “we are in the 
unenviable position of denying relief where there is no doubt 
that justice requires such relief,” id. at 959. 
 
 In 2007, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the 
Superior Court’s ruling that Bennett’s PCRA petition was 
time-barred.  Bennett II, 930 A.2d at 1275.  The Court 
characterized the decision as “significant” because the 
Superior Court had granted Wyatt relief “due to the trial 
court’s erroneous accomplice liability instruction.”  Id. at 
1266 n.3.  
 
 On remand, the trial court again reinstated Bennett’s 
right to appeal the denial of his PCRA petition.  Bennett 
appealed.  The Superior Court issued a procedural ruling in 
his favor.  It vacated the dismissal of Bennett’s PCRA 
petition and remanded for consideration of his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim.  Commonwealth v. Bennett 
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(Bennett III), No. 343 EDA 2008, at *19, 964 A.2d 428 (Pa. 
Super. Oct. 17, 2008) (table) (App. 164).  The Superior Court 
did not separately address Bennett’s due process claim. 
 
 On remand, Bennett won PCRA relief.  The trial court 
vacated his conviction for first degree murder and ordered a 
new trial on that charge.  It found that the jury instructions 
violated Bennett’s “state and federal constitutional rights to 
Due Process,” and that Bennett’s trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to object to them.  App. 176.   
 
 Bennett again won PCRA relief on the 
Commonwealth’s appeal.  Commonwealth v. Bennett (Bennett 
IV), 19 A.3d 541, 542 (Pa. Super. 2011).  The Superior Court 
held that the jury instructions on conspiracy and accomplice 
liability “did not tell the jurors that they needed to find 
Bennett possessed the specific intent to kill before they could 
convict him of first-degree murder.”  Id. at 544.  Rather, “the 
charge could likely have led jurors to conclude that Bennett, 
by being an accomplice and/or a conspirator in the robbery, 
was therefore equally responsible with the shooter for first-
degree murder, even without proof that Bennett himself had 
the specific intent to kill.”  Id.  Trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to object.  Id. at 542. 
 
 Still, Bennett did not get relief.  In 2011, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the Commonwealth’s 
petition for allowance of appeal, despite having denied the 
same request in Wyatt’s case nine years earlier.  Compare 
Commonwealth v. Bennett (Bennett V), 32 A.3d 586 (Pa. 
2011) (per curiam), with Commonwealth v. Wyatt, No. 521 
EAL 2001, 809 A.2d 904 (Pa. Oct. 15, 2002) (table).  It 
agreed to consider the question posed by the Commonwealth: 
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whether “overturning [Bennett’s] first-degree murder 
conviction on the basis of a supposedly defective accomplice 
liability instruction overlook[s] and contradict[s] th[e 
Pennsylvania Supreme] Court’s precedent.”  Bennett V, 32 
A.3d at 587.  
 
 In 2012, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the 
Superior Court’s grant of relief.  Bennett VI, 57 A.3d at 1187.  
Then-Chief Justice Castille wrote an opinion for a three-
Justice majority.7  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found 
that the only issue before it was the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim.  See id. at 1187 n.1, 1195.  As to Bennett’s 
“underlying” due process challenge to the jury instructions, 
the Court stated in passing that the issue was “defaulted,” id. 
at 1193, or “waived,” id. at 1204, but did not explain why this 
was so.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the jury 
instructions within its analysis of the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim.  It concluded that “in light of both the charge 
when read as a whole and the factual circumstances of this 
case,” the jury instructions did not violate state precedent.  Id. 
                                              
 7  In 1990, when this crime was committed and 
Bennett charged, Chief Justice Castille was the elected 
District Attorney of Philadelphia, where the crime took place.  
Chief Justice Castille left his position as District Attorney in 
1991.  Bennett’s capital jury trial took place in 1992.  Cf. 
Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1905 (2016) 
(holding that Chief Justice Castille was obligated to recuse 
himself where he had “significant, personal involvement as a 
prosecutor in a critical decision regarding the defendant’s 
case”).  It is not known how significant was his involvement 
when he was the District Attorney. 
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at 1196.  It followed that counsel was not deficient in failing 
to object.  See id. at 1203.8 
 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not address 
Bennett’s federal due process challenge to the jury 
instructions.  Although Bennett cited several decisions of our 
Court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that they were 
irrelevant to the state law question it was deciding.  Id. at 
1203 (“[W]e are not bound by the decisional law of the lower 
                                              
 8  When reviewing the charge as whole, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court emphasized the murder 
instruction.  See Bennett VI, 57 A.3d at 1200.  This portion of 
its opinion inaccurately quoted the record.  Specifically, the 
state court spliced together two disparate portions of the 
murder charge.  First, in the introduction, the trial court 
instructed the jury that “[e]ach defendant comes before you 
charged with murder and voluntary manslaughter.”  App. 605.  
Second, five paragraphs later, the trial court instructed the 
jury on first degree murder, directing it to determine whether 
“the defendant possessed a fully-formed intent to kill at the 
time when he acted . . . .”  App. 606.  The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court combined these quotes in one sentence.  It 
stated that the trial court “informed the jury that ‘each’ 
defendant could be found guilty of first-degree murder only if 
‘the defendant possessed a fully-formed intent to kill at the 
time when he acted.’”  Bennett VI, 57 A.3d at 1200.  This 
misstatement of the record was a clear error; the jury never 
heard that “each” defendant must have the specific intent to 
kill. 
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federal courts, construing Pennsylvania law.”).9  Rather, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied on state precedent to 
overturn the grant of PCRA relief.  Id. at 1197-99 (citing 
Commonwealth v. Thompson, 674 A.2d 217, 223 (Pa. 1996) 
and Commonwealth v. Simpson, 754 A.2d 1264, 1275-76 (Pa. 
2000)).  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the 
Superior Court erred by relying on another state decision, 
Huffman, 638 A.2d at 964, which the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court distinguished.  Bennett VI, 57 A.3d at 1187; see also id. 
at 1203 (“As we have made clear, the instant case is simply 
not controlled by Huffman . . . .”). 
 
 Justice Saylor, now Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, and Justice McCaffrey concurred.  Id. at 
1206 (Saylor, C.J., concurring).  They opined that the trial 
court’s jury instructions “could be taken as overriding the 
specific-intent requirement for first-degree murder.”  Id. at 
1207.  They were particularly concerned that the jury could 
have convicted Bennett of first degree murder because he was 
“an accomplice or conspirator in some other crime.”  Id. 
(emphasis in original).  Specifically, the concurring Justices 
emphasized that the jury instructions stated that: (1) “[w]hen 
two or more join in the commission of an unjustified assault 
which results fatally, all are guilty”; (2) a co-conspirator is 
“equally responsible for the homicide” as the principal; and 
(3) “[s]uch responsibility . . . extend[s] even to a homicide 
which is the consequence of the natural and probable 
execution of the conspiracy even though such homicide is not 
                                              
 9  While the state court referred to our decision in 
Everett in a footnote, it merely held that the case was 
factually distinguishable.  Bennett VI, 57 A.3d at 1203 n.10 
(citing Everett, 290 F.3d at 504). 
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specifically contemplated by the parties.”  Id. at 1206-07 
(emphases, ellipses and second brackets in original) (quoting 
Bennett VI, 57 A.3d at 1188-89). 
 
 However, the concurring Justices found that they were 
“bound” by Pennsylvania law.  Bennett VI, 57 A.3d at 1208 
(Saylor, C.J., concurring).  Prior state court decisions, they 
explained, had established “that a trial court’s reference to 
‘the defendant’ in a jury charge delineating the requirement of 
specific intent to kill to support a first-degree-murder 
conviction ameliorates potential ambiguities which might 
otherwise arise out of accomplice or coconspirator liability 
instructions.”  Id.  They concluded that, under state law, 
Bennett’s claim lacked merit, but there remained a claim “to 
be litigated in the federal courts under due process theory.”  
Id. at 1208 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
 C. Habeas Corpus Proceedings in the District  
  Court 
 
 After his PCRA relief was reversed, Bennett filed a 
timely pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  He raised 
two claims in the District Court: (1) that he was deprived of 
due process under the United States Constitution because the 
trial court’s jury instructions erroneously relieved the 
Commonwealth of its burden to prove the specific intent to 
kill, and (2) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to the flawed jury instructions.  Bennett asserted that 
he was entitled to de novo review because the state court did 
not adjudicate his federal due process claim on the merits.  In 
response, the Commonwealth argued that Bennett’s claims 
had been decided on the merits, and that he could not 
overcome the standard of review of the Antiterrorism and 
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Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d)(1). 
 
 The District Court referred the matter to a Magistrate 
Judge who issued a report and recommendation.  As to 
Bennett’s underlying due process claim, the Magistrate Judge 
agreed with Bennett that the conspiracy and accomplice 
liability jury instructions “do seemingly relieve the 
Commonwealth of the burden of proving that Bennett had the 
specific intent to kill, rather than the intent to rob the store.”  
App. 21.  However, she recommended denying relief under 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  The Magistrate Judge nevertheless 
observed that numerous state judges had questioned “the 
propriety of the charge given in this case in well-reasoned 
decisions,” and so recommended granting a certificate of 
appealability “on Bennett’s due process claim.”  App. 30.  
The Magistrate Judge recommended denying Bennett’s 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim without a certificate of 
appealability.  The District Court adopted the Report and 
Recommendation and granted the certificate of appealability 
in part and denied it in part. 
 
 D. Bennett’s Habeas Corpus Appeal to this  
  Court 
 
 Bennett filed this timely appeal.  Consistent with the 
certificate of appealability, Bennett seeks our review of one 
claim—his federal due process challenge to the trial court’s 
jury instructions.  He does not appeal the denial of his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
 
 The Commonwealth’s response is surprisingly 
incongruous.  It has chosen not to respond to Bennett’s due 
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process claim—the only claim raised on appeal.  Instead, it 
takes the unusual position that Bennett must be raising an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  The Commonwealth 
asserts as much repeatedly in its brief.  For example, it 
contends that “Bennett spends 40 pages arguing about the 
quality of the jury instructions []presumably to make a point 
that trial counsel’s decision not to object was a failure of 
performance.”  Br. for Appellees at 54.  This is incorrect.  
Bennett addresses the quality of the jury instructions because 
the claim certified on appeal is a due process challenge to 
those instructions. 
 
 The Commonwealth offers an equally unusual 
explanation for its approach.  It asserts that Bennett’s claim 
must be “a Strickland-ineffectiveness claim [because] [t]he 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court identified it as such in the first 
page of its opinion.”  Id. at 24.  Again, this is incorrect.  The 
issue on appeal is the claim authorized by the certificate of 
appealability—a due process challenge to the trial court’s jury 
instructions.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3); see also Fed. R. 
App. P. 22(b); Local App. R. 22.2.  Therefore, this is the 
claim we will address.10 
 
II. Exhaustion 
 
 Under AEDPA, a habeas petitioner must “exhaust[] 
the remedies available” in state court.  28 U.S.C. 
                                              
 10  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2241 and 2254.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1291 and 2253.  We exercise plenary review of the District 
Court’s decision.  Showers v. Beard, 635 F.3d 625, 628 (3d 
Cir. 2011). 
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§ 2254(b)(1)(A).  To do so, the petitioner must “‘fairly 
present’ . . . a federal claim’s factual and legal substance to 
the state courts in a manner that puts them on notice that a 
federal claim is being asserted.”  McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 
F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 1999).  In Pennsylvania, a defendant 
“exhausts his state remedies for a federal claim either by 
raising the claim on direct appeal or in a petition for collateral 
relief under the PCRA.”  Wilkerson v. Superintendent, 871 
F.3d 221, 228-29 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Mathias v. 
Superintendent, 876 F.3d 462, 479-80 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding 
that the petitioner exhausted his federal due process claim on 
PCRA review).   
 
 As to Bennett, the Commonwealth did not raise 
exhaustion before the District Court or in its opening brief to 
this Court.  Although it did purport to raise exhaustion in two 
letters styled under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
28(j), the argument falls outside the bounds of that rule.  See 
United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 163 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(holding that a party cannot use a Rule 28(j) letter to raise 
additional arguments omitted from an opening brief); United 
States v. Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498, 506 n.7 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(declining to consider new arguments outside the scope of 
Rule 28(j)). 
 
 We need not determine whether the Commonwealth 
expressly waived the exhaustion requirement because we hold 
that Bennett did exhaust his federal due process claim.  See 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3); see also Sharrieff v. Cathel, 574 F.3d 
225, 230 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Section 2254(b)(3) requires that a 
state’s waiver of exhaustion be express, but it does not 
demand the invocation of any ‘magic words.’”).  Bennett 
fairly presented his federal claim on PCRA review by citing 
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the relevant provision of the United States Constitution and 
federal cases supporting his argument.  See Wilkerson, 871 
F.3d at 229 (citing McCandless, 172 F.3d at 261-62).11 
                                              
 11  We are mindful that Bennett’s counsel did not 
object to the challenged jury instructions and did not file a 
direct appeal.  Perhaps for these reasons the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court stated without explanation that the underlying 
due process challenge to the jury instructions was “defaulted” 
or “waived.”  Bennett VI, 57 A.3d at 1193, 1204.  The 
Commonwealth, however, has failed to raise and therefore 
waived any potential defense of procedural default. 
 “The doctrine of procedural default prohibits federal 
courts from reviewing a state court decision involving a 
federal question if the state court decision is based on a rule 
of state law that is independent of the federal question and 
adequate to support the judgment.”  Bey v. Superintendent, 
856 F.3d 230, 236 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Fahy v. Horn, 516 
F.3d 169, 187 (3d Cir. 2008)); see also Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 
449, 465 (2009).  “[P]rocedural default is normally a defense 
that the State is obligated to raise and preserve if it is not to 
lose the right to assert the defense thereafter.”  Trest v. Cain, 
522 U.S. 87, 89 (1997) (internal quotation marks, alteration 
and citation omitted); see also Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 
376 n.8 (2002) (stating that state waived procedural default 
by failing to raise the argument in the appellate court or in 
opposition to certiorari); Showers v. Beard, 635 F.3d 625, 629 
(3d Cir. 2011) (procedural default waived); Smith v. Horn, 
120 F.3d 400, 408-09 (3d Cir. 1997) (same).  Unlike 
exhaustion, waiver of procedural default need not be express.  
Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3).   
 In Bennett’s case, the Commonwealth did not preserve 
the defense of procedural default before either the District 
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III. Standard of Review 
 
 AEDPA’s Section 2254(d) limits the ability of a 
federal court to grant habeas corpus relief to a petitioner 
based upon a federal constitutional claim that was 
“adjudicated on the merits” in state court.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d).  If Section 2254(d) applies, habeas relief shall not 
be granted unless the adjudication  
 
(1) resulted in a decision that was 
contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law, as 
                                                                                                     
Court or this Court.  In the District Court, the Commonwealth 
asserted the opposite position—that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court had adjudicated Bennett’s federal due process 
claim on the merits.  On appeal, the Commonwealth did not 
argue procedural default.  At the most, the Commonwealth 
asserted—without citation, in a footnote—that “only the 
Strickland claim is not defaulted and properly before this 
Court.”  Br. for Appellees 20 n.9.  We “refuse to take 
cognizance of arguments that are made in passing without 
proper development.”  Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 
299 (2013); see also Hoffecker, 530 F.3d at 162.   
 Thus, the defense of procedural default is waived.  We 
do not reach the question whether the requirements of 
procedural default would have been satisfied.  See 
Munchinski v. Wilson, 694 F.3d 308, 335 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(holding that state court “did not ‘clearly and expressly’ rely” 
on state procedural rule to deny PCRA relief).  Nor do we 
determine whether Bennett could have overcome any default. 
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determined by the Supreme Court 
of the United States; or 
 
(2) resulted in a decision that was 
based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light 
of the evidence presented in the 
State court proceeding. 
 
Id.   
 
 If a claim was not adjudicated on the merits in state 
court, we review legal questions and mixed questions of law 
and fact de novo.  Cone, 556 U.S. at 472 (citing Rompilla v. 
Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390 (2005), and Wiggins v. Smith, 539 
U.S. 510, 534 (2003)); see also Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 
210 (3d Cir. 2001).  “However, the state court’s factual 
determinations are still presumed to be correct, rebuttable 
upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence.”  Appel, 
250 F.3d at 210 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).12 
 
 A. Legal Standard: Adjudication on the Merits 
 
 Because it dictates the standard of review, a predicate 
question in habeas corpus proceedings is whether the state 
court adjudicated a claim on the merits.  A judgment is “‘on 
the merits’ only if it was ‘delivered after the court . . . heard 
and evaluated the evidence and the parties’ substantive 
                                              
 12  The parties agree that the operative state court 
decision is the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision 
reversing the grant of PCRA relief, Bennett VI, 57 A.3d at 
1187. 
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arguments.’”  Williams, 568 U.S. at 302 (emphasis and 
ellipsis in original).  “On the merits” means, in this context, 
review of the “intrinsic rights and wrongs” of the matter.  Id. 
(emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
 In some cases, “a state court issues an order that 
summarily rejects without discussion all the claims raised by 
a defendant.”  Id. at 293 (emphasis omitted) (citing 
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011)).  In those 
circumstances, “the federal habeas court must presume 
(subject to rebuttal) that the federal claim was adjudicated on 
the merits.”  Williams, 568 U.S. at 293. 
 
 There is also a closely related situation, addressed in 
Williams, where the “state court rules against the defendant 
and issues an opinion that addresses some issues but does not 
expressly address the federal claim in question.”  Id. at 292.  
Under these circumstances, the state court is silent as to the 
reasons for denying the federal claim.  It “follows logically” 
that the Richter rule applies.  Id. at 293.  That is, the same 
presumption—that the federal claim was adjudicated on the 
merits—applies whether the state court does not address “any 
of the defendant’s claims” or “some but not all of a 
defendant’s claims.”  Id. at 298 (emphasis in original); see 
also Dennis v. Secretary, 834 F.3d 263, 312 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(en banc) (applying Williams presumption to claim of 
cumulative prejudice).  But see James v. Ryan, 733 F.3d 911, 
915 (9th Cir. 2013) (distinguishing Richter and Williams). 
 
 The Williams presumption that a federal claim was 
adjudicated on the merits is rebuttable.  It applies only “in the 
absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to 
the contrary.”  Williams, 568 U.S. at 298 (quoting Richter, 
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562 U.S. at 99).  “The presumption may be overcome when 
there is reason to think some other explanation for the state 
court’s decision is more likely.”  Richter, 562 U.S. at 99-100. 
 
 Williams rejected as “go[ing] too far” the state’s 
argument for an irrebuttable presumption.  Williams, 568 U.S. 
at 301.  The Supreme Court explained that both parties may 
attempt to rebut the presumption that a federal claim was 
adjudicated on the merits.  A petitioner may attempt to rebut 
the presumption in order to obtain de novo review.  Id. at 301-
02.  The state may attempt to rebut the presumption in order 
to show that a federal claim was defaulted.  Id. at 302.     
 
 Williams set forth a non-exhaustive list of “other 
explanation[s] for the state court’s decision” sufficient to 
rebut the presumption that a federal claim was adjudicated on 
the merits.  Richter, 562 U.S. at 100.  They include the 
following:  A state court may have “inadvertently 
overlooked” the federal claim.  Williams, 568 U.S. at 303; see 
also Brown v. Romanowski, 845 F.3d 703, 711-12 (6th Cir. 
2017); Bester v. Warden, 836 F.3d 1331, 1336-37 (11th Cir. 
2016).  A state court may have applied a state standard that is 
“in at least some circumstances . . . less protective” or “quite 
different from the federal standard.”  Williams, 568 U.S. at 
301 (emphasis in original); see also Ashburn v. Korte, 761 
F.3d 741, 751 (7th Cir. 2014).  It may have disregarded the 
federal claim based upon a belief—correct or not—that the 
federal claim was not fairly presented.  Williams, 568 U.S. at 
302-03; see also Barton v. Warden, 786 F.3d 450, 461-62 
(6th Cir. 2015).  Where the Williams presumption is rebutted 
for one of these, or any other reason, review of the claim is de 
novo.  Williams, 568 U.S. at 301-02. 
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 B. Bennett’s Due Process Claim Not   
  Adjudicated on the Merits 
 
 In Bennett’s case, we begin by considering whether the 
Williams presumption applies.  We conclude that it does not 
because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressly stated that 
it did not perceive there to be any federal claim presented.  
Accordingly, this is not a case where the state court “rule[d] 
against the defendant and issue[d] an opinion that addresse[d] 
some issues but d[id] not expressly address the federal claim 
in question.”  Id. at 292.  Rather, the Court provided an 
“explicit explanation of its own decision,” and so the 
Williams presumption is inapplicable.  James, 733 F.3d at 
916.13   
 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s own explicit 
statements further establish that Bennett’s federal due process 
claim was not adjudicated on the merits.  See Cone, 556 U.S. 
at 472.  This is apparent for several reasons.  To begin with, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review of Bennett’s 
PCRA petition only on the state law question presented by the 
Commonwealth—whether “overturning [Bennett’s] first-
degree murder conviction on the basis of a supposedly 
defective accomplice liability instruction overlook[s] and 
contradict[s] th[e Pennsylvania Supreme] Court’s precedent.”  
Bennett V, 32 A.3d at 587.  It characterized the “underlying” 
federal due process claim as “defaulted,” while providing no 
explanation for this statement.  Bennett VI, 57 A.3d at 1193.  
The Court then addressed the ineffective assistance claim as 
                                              
 13 Moreover, as explained below, we would apply de 
novo review even if the Williams presumption were 
applicable because Bennett has rebutted it. 
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relating exclusively to counsel’s failure to object on state law 
grounds and did not acknowledge or address any deficiency 
or prejudice in counsel’s failure to raise a federal due process 
claim.  Id. at 1196-1203.  It held that Bennett’s PCRA 
petition lacked merit because it was in conflict with “[the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s] developed case law.”  Id. at 
1202.  It identified the error of the lower state courts in 
granting PCRA relief as a “failure to consider controlling, 
subsequent cases by th[e Pennsylvania Supreme] Court.”  Id. 
at 1203.  Indeed, the Court even said that to the extent 
Bennett cited federal cases, they were not binding in the 
context of “construing Pennsylvania law.” Id. 
 
 Furthermore, even if the Williams presumption were to 
apply, we would conclude that Bennett has rebutted it.  
Applying the Williams presumption, the question that follows 
is whether Bennett has rebutted the presumption that his 
federal claim was adjudicated on the merits.  He has because 
“the evidence leads very clearly to the conclusion that [the] 
federal claim was inadvertently overlooked in state court.”  
Williams, 568 U.S. at 303.  For the reasons above, there is no 
ambiguity as to whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
resolved the federal due process claim on the merits; the 
Court made clear that it overlooked it.  It expressly declined 
to rule on Bennett’s federal claim, and held that it “need not 
review and compare each of the federal cases” cited by 
Bennett because it was deciding a state law question.  Bennett 
VI, 57 A.3d at 1203; see also id. (stating that “we are not 
bound by the decisional law of the lower federal courts, 
construing Pennsylvania law”); id. at 1193 (characterizing the 
“underlying” due process challenge as “defaulted”).  Because 
the Court made a “clear demarcation” between the state and 
federal questions and ruled on the merits of only the former, 
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the Williams presumption is rebutted.  Brown, 845 F.3d at 712 
(holding that federal claim was overlooked under Williams, as 
evidenced by the fact that the state court expressly addressed 
all claims in the petitioner’s original motion, but none in his 
amended motion).14  Therefore, we will review Bennett’s due 
process claim de novo.15 
                                              
 14  We note, furthermore, that unlike Williams the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not “underst[an]d itself to 
be deciding a question with federal constitutional 
dimensions.”  Williams, 568 U.S. at 305.  The Court relied 
upon two state cases, Thompson and Simpson, which do not 
have federal constitutional underpinnings.  See Bennett VI, 57 
A.3d at 1198-99 (citing Thompson, 674 A.2d at 223, and 
Simpson, 754 A.2d at 1275-76).  The Pennsylvania state case 
that arguably does have federal constitutional underpinnings 
is Huffman, which cites In re Winship for the proposition that 
a meritorious jury instruction claim did not amount to 
harmless error.  Huffman, 638 A.2d at 963 (citing In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).  Huffman, however, is the 
very case that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held was 
inapplicable to Bennett.  Bennett VI, 57 A.3d at 1187; see 
also id. at 1203 (“As we have made clear, the instant case is 
simply not controlled by Huffman . . . .”).  As Chief Justice 
Saylor put it, “the only surviving vestige of Huffman is that 
which remains to be litigated in the federal courts under due 
process theory.”  Bennett VI, 57 A.3d at 1208 n.3 (Saylor, 
C.J., concurring) (quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 912 A.2d 
268, 297 (Pa. 2006) (Saylor, C.J., concurring)).  
 
 15  In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful of the 
Supreme Court’s observation that having a less protective 
state standard would “provide no guidance to state trial judges 
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IV. Analysis of the Merits 
 
 While the state may choose how to define first degree 
murder, McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85 (1986), 
the Constitution requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 
every element necessary to constitute the crime, In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.  Due process is violated when a 
jury instruction relieves the government of its burden of 
proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt.  See 
Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 190-91 (2009); 
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 521 (1979). 
 
 Under the federal due process standard, we ask 
whether there is “some ‘ambiguity, inconsistency, or 
                                                                                                     
bound to follow both state and federal law.”  Williams, 568 
U.S. at 305.  This may indeed be the case in Pennsylvania.  In 
fact, Chief Justice Saylor has cautioned the state trial courts to 
follow the federal due process standard, because the 
alternative—following state law—“risks a needless waste of 
untold resources on the part of the Commonwealth, defense 
attorneys, and the courts” when those cases are challenged on 
due process grounds.  Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 55 A.3d 
1108, 1158 (Pa. 2012) (Saylor, C.J., concurring).  Indeed, 
Pennsylvania’s suggested jury instructions also appear to 
exceed the requirements of state law, although that issue is 
not before us.  See Bennett VI, 57 A.3d at 1201 n.9 (noting 
that the standard jury instructions “now include a specific 
charge related to liability for the conduct of another person 
for the crime of first-degree murder for both accomplice and 
conspiracy liability” but reiterating that “these are merely 
suggested instructions”). 
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deficiency’ in the instruction, such . . . that there was ‘a 
reasonable likelihood’ that the jury applied the instruction in a 
way that relieved the State of its burden of proving every 
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Sarausad, 
555 U.S. at 190-91 (quoting Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 
433, 437 (2004) (per curiam), and Estelle v. McGuire, 502 
U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 
370, 380 (1990))).  “In making this determination, the jury 
instruction ‘may not be judged in artificial isolation,’ but 
must be considered in the context of the instructions as a 
whole and the trial record.”  Id. at 191 (quoting Estelle, 502 
U.S. at 72 (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 
(1973))).   
 
 Under federal law, “[l]anguage that merely contradicts 
and does not explain a constitutionally infirm instruction will 
not suffice to absolve the infirmity.”  Francis v. Franklin, 471 
U.S. 307, 322 (1985).  “While a single defect does not 
necessarily make an instruction erroneous, . . . other language 
in the instruction does not always serve to cure the error.  
This is so even when other language correctly explains the 
law.”  Bey, 856 F.3d at 241 & n.54 (ellipsis in original) 
(quoting Whitney v. Horn, 280 F.3d 240, 256 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(citing Franklin, 471 U.S. at 222)).  This is because “[a] 
reviewing court has no way of knowing which of the two 
irreconcilable instructions the jurors applied in reaching their 
verdict.”  Franklin, 471 U.S. at 322.  As such, there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instructions 
incorrectly in violation of the right to due process.  Id. at 
325.16  This Court has repeatedly reaffirmed this longstanding 
                                              
 16  This Court recently noted a potential “tension” 
between Franklin, 471 U.S. at 322, and a subsequent per 
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principle.  See Bey, 856 F.3d at 241; Laird, 414 F.3d at 428; 
Bronshtein, 404 F.3d at 712; Whitney, 280 F.3d at 256. 
 
 As to jury instructions on the specific intent to kill, our 
Court is troubled by the likelihood that the instructions as a 
whole could lead a jury to believe that an accomplice or 
conspirator to one crime is guilty of first degree murder 
despite having no specific intent to kill.  Indeed, we have 
repeatedly identified due process violations for this very 
reason.  See, e.g., Laird, 414 F.3d at 427 (stating that “the 
jury could easily have convicted Laird of first-degree murder 
based on his conspiring with Chester to kidnap or assault”); 
Bronshtein, 404 F.3d at 711 (noting that “the jury could find 
Bronshtein guilty of first-degree murder if it found that he 
had conspired to commit the robbery”); Smith, 120 F.3d at 
414 (holding that there was a reasonable likelihood that the 
                                                                                                     
curiam decision, Middleton, 541 U.S. at 437-38, but declined 
to resolve it.  Mathias, 876 F.3d at 478.  We now conclude 
that Middleton did not overrule Franklin.  The Supreme Court 
has cautioned the Courts of Appeals not to conclude that its 
precedent has been overturned by implication, and Middleton 
did not overrule Franklin or even refer to it.  Agostini v. 
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997).  Moreover, Middleton did 
not directly address whether there had been a federal due 
process violation, but rather only whether the state court’s 
application of federal law was objectively unreasonable under 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  541 U.S. at 436.  This explains why 
our Court continues to apply Franklin as binding precedent, 
and has done so repeatedly post-Middleton.  See Bey, 856 
F.3d at 241 & n.54; Laird, 414 F.3d at 428; Bronshtein, 404 
F.3d at 712. 
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jurors convicted Smith of first degree murder because they 
found that he was an accomplice to robbery).17 
                                              
 17  In contrast, Pennsylvania state law construes the 
instructions “as a whole” in a particular way—one highly 
permissive of instructional errors regarding the specific intent 
to kill of conspirators or accomplices.  Thompson, 674 A.2d 
at 219 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Its permissive 
approach is this: under the state standard, the instructions as a 
whole survive review, so long as an erroneous charge on the 
specific intent to kill is paired with standard definitions—
such as the standard definitions of accomplice liability and 
conspiracy, Commonwealth v. Speight, 854 A.2d 450, 460-61 
(Pa. 2004), or the standard definition of accomplice liability 
and a statement that first degree murder is intentional, 
Commonwealth v. Daniels, 963 A.2d 409, 431-32 (Pa. 2009); 
Commonwealth v. Cox, 863 A.2d 536, 550-51 (Pa. 2004).  Put 
more critically, state law relies on the inclusion of standard 
definitions to obviate the grant of relief on misleading 
instructions regarding the specific intent to kill.  Jones, 912 
A.2d at 296 (Saylor, C.J., concurring).  State law thus rejects 
the argument that the inclusion of standard definitions only 
creates inconsistency and does not cure the error.   
 The problem is that, even with standard definitions, the 
instructions as a whole could lead a jury to believe that an 
accomplice or conspirator to a lesser crime is guilty of first 
degree murder despite having no specific intent to kill.  For 
example, a jury could conclude that “an accomplice and/or a 
conspirator in [a] robbery . . . was thereby equally responsible 
with the shooter for first-degree murder, even without proof 
that [the defendant] himself had the specific intent to kill.”  
Bennett IV, 19 A.3d at 544, vacated by Bennett VI, 57 A.3d at 
1187.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected this 
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 In Bennett’s case, the trial court’s jury instructions on 
conspiracy and accomplice liability were deficient, or at the 
least ambiguous and inconsistent.  The trial court repeatedly 
suggested that the jury could convict Bennett of first degree 
murder based upon the shooter’s specific intent to kill.  It 
instructed the jury that where conspirators join together to 
commit an “unjustified assault which results fatally, all are 
guilty.”  App. 602.  It instructed the jury that when 
conspirators “combine to commit a felony or to make an 
assault, and in carrying out the common purpose another is 
killed, the one who enters into the combination but does not 
personally commit the wrongful act is equally responsible for 
the homicide as the one who directly causes it.”  Id.  It 
instructed the jury that a conspiratorial liability “extend[s] 
even to a homicide . . . even though such homicide is not 
specifically contemplated.”  App. 603.  It instructed the jury 
that, among accomplices, “the act of one is the act of all.”  
App. 604. 
 
 Reviewing these instructions in the context of the trial 
record, we conclude that there is “‘a reasonable likelihood’ 
that the jury applied the[se] instruction[s] in a way that 
relieved the State of its burden of proving” the specific intent 
to kill.  Sarausad, 555 U.S. at 191 (quoting Estelle, 502 U.S. 
at 72 (quoting Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380)).  The trial evidence 
established that Bennett “conspired . . . to rob a jewelry store 
in Philadelphia at gunpoint.”  Bennett VI, 57 A.3d at 1187.  
“Bennett supplied the loaded gun, but did not enter the store.”  
                                                                                                     
argument as “without merit” under state law.  Bennett VI, 57 
A.3d at 1203; see also Cox, 863 A.2d at 561-62 (Saylor, C.J., 
dissenting). 
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Id.  He was sitting in the passenger seat of the getaway car 
when the shooter, Mayo, botched the robbery, killing the 
clerk.  Id.  In light of the record, there is “a reasonable 
likelihood” that the jury found that Bennett was guilty of first 
degree murder because he was a conspirator and accomplice 
to the robbery, not because it found that he possessed the 
requisite specific intent.  Sarausad, 555 U.S. at 190-91 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Laird, 414 F.3d 
at 427; Smith, 120 F.3d at 414. 
 
 We reach this holding having also considered the 
instructions as a whole, particularly the first degree murder 
charge.  In this portion of the charge, the trial court instructed 
the jury that first degree murder is an intentional killing, 
wherein “the defendant consciously decided to kill the victim 
and . . . possessed a fully-formed intent to kill at the time 
when he acted.”  App. 606.  It further instructed the jury that 
“[i]f a defendant intentionally uses a deadly weapon on a vital 
part of the body, you may infer from this that the killing was 
intentional.”  App. 607.   
 
 Bennett asserts that the first degree instruction was 
itself ambiguous because the “defendant” could have been the 
shooter, Mayo.  He points out that Mayo is the only person 
who “use[d] a deadly weapon.”  Id.  Bennett notes that Mayo 
began the trial as a defendant, and the Commonwealth 
continued to refer to Mayo as a “defendant” throughout its 
opening statement and closing argument.  See App. 304 
(“these two defendants T.S., Michael Mayo and . . . 
Johnson”); App. 309 (“The defendant Mayo”); App. 310 
(“you will see what the defendant [Mayo] does”); App. 312 
(“the defendant T.S., Michael Mayo, who is not here”); App. 
570 (“the defendants, two of them being T.S., T.S., the man 
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who is not here”); App. 575 (“the defendant Mayo”).18  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, disagreed with this 
interpretation.  Bennett VI, 57 A.3d at 1202.  As such, the 
Commonwealth argues that we are bound by the state court’s 
factual determination under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 
 
 Even if the state court’s interpretation of the first 
degree murder charge is correct, the charge as a whole still 
violated Bennett’s due process rights.  The first degree 
murder charge, at the most, contradicted the erroneous 
conspiracy and accomplice liability instructions.  Nothing in 
this language “or in the charge as a whole makes clear to the 
jury that one of these contradictory instructions carries more 
weight than the other.  Language that merely contradicts and 
does not explain a constitutionally infirm instruction will not 
suffice to absolve the infirmity.”  Franklin, 471 U.S. at 322; 
see also Bey, 856 F.3d at 241 & n.54; Laird, 414 F.3d at 428; 
Bronshtein, 404 F.3d at 712.  “A reviewing court has no way 
of knowing which of the two irreconcilable instructions the 
jurors applied in reaching their verdict.”  Franklin, 471 U.S. 
at 322.  Thus, it was reasonably likely that the jury applied 
the instructions to relieve the Commonwealth of its burden of 
proving that Bennett had the specific intent to kill. 
 
 Our conclusion is further supported by the arguments 
of counsel, although they “carry less weight with a jury” than 
the trial court’s instructions.  Sarausad, 555 U.S. at 195 
(quoting Boyde, 494 U.S. at 384).  In Bennett’s case, the 
arguments compounded the instructional error.  The 
Commonwealth never argued that Bennett had the specific 
intent to kill.  To the contrary, in its opening statement, the 
                                              
 18  “T.S.” is a nickname for Mayo. 
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prosecutor told the jury “lest you think I am crazy for saying 
[Bennett, Johnson and Wyatt] are guilty of first degree 
murder, when I told you that Michael Mayo fired the fatal 
shots . . . I will urge upon you that the law of conspiracy 
makes all of these defendants first degree murderers.”  App. 
312-13.  In closing, the prosecutor argued that “accomplices 
are equally guilty with the principal.  First degree murder, 
intent to kill.  There is no doubt, there can be no doubt that 
[the shooter] Michael Mayo intended to kill [the victim]. . . . 
Co-conspirators and accomplices are equally guilty with the 
principal.”  App. 591-92.  These arguments increased the 
likelihood that the jury interpreted the charge so as to relieve 
the Commonwealth of its burden of proof.     
 
 Thus, we conclude that the trial court’s jury 
instructions relieved the Commonwealth of its burden of 
proving that Bennett had the specific intent to kill, in 
violation of his right to due process under the United States 
Constitution.  We are far from the first court to reach this 
conclusion.  To the contrary, thirteen different Pennsylvania 
judges, in four separate decisions, have held or opined that 
these very jury instructions allowed the jury to convict of first 
degree murder without finding the specific intent to kill.  See 
Bennett I, 842 A.2d at 954; Bennett IV, 19 A.3d at 542; Wyatt, 
No. 2050 EDA 1999, *1; App. 167; see also Bennett II, 930 
A.2d at 1266 n.3 (noting “the trial court’s erroneous 
accomplice liability instruction”).  Two additional concurring 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court justices recognized that the 
“charge could be taken as overriding the specific-intent 
requirement for first-degree murder.”  Bennett VI, 57 A.3d at 
1207 (Saylor, C.J., concurring).  We agree.   
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V. Harmless Error 
 
 This brings us to the issue of harmless error.  Brecht v. 
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).  Under Brecht, this Court 
must grant habeas relief if an error “had a substantial and 
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s 
verdict.”  Id. at 623 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 
U.S. 750, 776 (1946)); see also Mathias, 876 F.3d at 480.  If, 
“in the judge’s mind, the matter is so evenly balanced that he 
feels himself in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the 
error[,] . . . the uncertain judge should treat the error, not as if 
it were harmless, but as if it affected the verdict.”  O’Neal v. 
McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435 (1995); see also Adamson v. 
Cathel, 633 F.3d 248, 260 (3d Cir. 2011).  A state may waive 
the harmless error defense by failing to assert it “timely and 
unequivocal[ly].”  Lam v. Kelchner, 304 F.3d 256, 269 (3d 
Cir. 2002); see also Gibbs v. Frank, 387 F.3d 268, 277 n.7 
(3d Cir. 2004).   
 
 In Bennett’s case, the Commonwealth waived the 
harmless error defense by failing to assert it unequivocally on 
appeal.  This is a product of its unusual approach to briefing 
this case.  As explained above, it chose not to address 
Bennett’s due process claim—the only issue on appeal.  
Instead, it addressed a hypothetical claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  In keeping with this approach, the 
Commonwealth did not argue harmless error.  Instead, it 
argued that Bennett failed to prove prejudice for a 
hypothetical claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  This Strickland argument is not 
an “unequivocal” harmless error argument.  Lam, 304 F.3d at 
269.  Moreover, to the extent the Commonwealth’s Strickland 
argument left open the question whether it was asserting 
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harmless error, any such possibility was eliminated by the 
Commonwealth’s Rule 28(j) letter of May 19, 2017.  In this 
letter, the Commonwealth took the position that “Strickland 
prejudice and harmless error are different, and it is the former 
standard that applies to the only claim properly before the 
Court.”  Appellees’ 28(j) Letter at 1 (May 19, 2017).  But cf. 
Whitney, 280 F.3d at 258 n.18 (suggesting that “if a habeas 
petitioner meets the Strickland test, then he/she need not also 
demonstrate that the error was harmful”).  Thus, the harmless 
error defense is waived. 
 
 Moreover, even if we were to reach harmless error, we 
would conclude that the due process violation is not harmless 
in the context of “the record as a whole.”  Brecht, 507 U.S. at 
638.  The trial evidence established that Bennett conspired to 
commit armed robbery, and was sitting in the passenger seat 
of the getaway car when the shooter, Mayo, botched the 
robbery and killed the clerk.  Bennett VI, 57 A.3d at 1187.  
The Commonwealth never argued that Bennett had the 
specific intent to kill.  Its theory of the case was that Bennett 
was guilty of first degree murder solely because he was an 
accomplice and conspirator.  In its opening statement, the 
prosecutor told the jury “that the law of conspiracy makes all 
of these defendants first degree murderers.”  App. 313.  In 
closing, the prosecutor argued that that “[c]o-conspirators and 
accomplices are equally guilty” of first degree murder.  App. 
592.  The Commonwealth, “[h]aving repeatedly urged the 
jury to base its verdict on a theory predicated on a 
fundamental constitutional error, . . . cannot now seriously 
contend that that error had no ‘substantial and injurious effect 
or influence’ on the verdict.”  Smith, 120 F.3d at 419. 
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 Nor would the error be harmless under Bronshtein.  
There we held that the trial court’s jury instructions relieved 
the Commonwealth of its burden to prove the specific intent 
to kill, but that the error was harmless.  404 F.3d at 711-12.  
In Bronshtein it necessarily followed from the particular jury 
instructions, and the verdict of guilt on conspiracy to murder, 
that the jury “must have found . . . the specific intent to kill.”  
Id. at 714; see also Mathias, 876 F.3d at 467, 480 (following 
Bronshtein where the jury convicted the defendant of 
conspiracy to commit first degree murder).  This is not so in 
Bennett’s case.  Unlike Bronshtein, the Commonwealth 
charged Bennett with conspiracy generally, and the trial court 
instructed the jury that the object of the conspiracy was 
murder, robbery, possession of an instrument of crime, and a 
firearms violation.  Therefore, we cannot infer anything about 
the specific intent to kill from the jury’s conspiracy verdict.  
See Laird, 414 F.3d at 430 (distinguishing Bronshtein).  The 
jury might have found that Bennett intended to participate in 
the robbery, and so was “equally responsible for the 
homicide,” as the trial court erroneously instructed.  App. 
602.   
 
 Finally, we address the Commonwealth’s argument 
that there is no Strickland prejudice to support a hypothetical 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  In its brief, the 
Commonwealth argues that Bennett could not prove prejudice 
for a hypothetical ineffectiveness claim under our decision in 
Rainey v. Varner, 603 F.3d 189, 203 (3d Cir. 2010).  In 
Rainey, the petitioner asserted ineffective assistance of 
counsel for counsel’s failure to challenge the sufficiency of 
the evidence for first degree murder.  We held that even if the 
evidence were insufficient for first degree murder, the 
petitioner would have been convicted of second degree 
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murder, and would have received the same mandatory life 
sentence.  Id. at 202.  Therefore, Rainey held that the 
petitioner failed to establish Strickland prejudice.  Id. at 203. 
 
 Rainey does not control Bennett’s due process claim 
for two reasons.  First, the Commonwealth has never argued 
that Rainey applies to the claim actually raised—a due 
process challenge to the trial court’s jury instructions on the 
specific intent to kill.  Therefore, any argument that Rainey 
applies to this claim is waived.  Second, even if the argument 
were preserved, we would decline to extend Rainey outside of 
its context—a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to 
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for first degree 
murder, where the petitioner would nevertheless have been 
convicted of second degree murder, which required the same 
mandatory life sentence under state law.  Id. at 201-02.19   
                                              
 19 In declining to read Rainey outside of its context, we 
note that Rainey relied on three Supreme Court decisions for 
the proposition that Strickland prejudice requires a reasonable 
probability of “a different sentence.”  Rainey, 603 F.3d at 202 
n.5.  Each of the cited cases, however, addressed claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase.  Id. 
(citing Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41 (2009) (per 
curiam); Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 20 (2009) (per 
curiam); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 536 (2003)).  Even 
the Commonwealth, in opposing certiorari, read Rainey as a 
narrow decision that “certainly did not purport to redefine 
prejudice globally by adding a requirement of a more onerous 
sentence for all petitioners alleging guilt-phase 
ineffectiveness.”  Br. for Respondents in Opp’n to Pet. for 
Writ of Cert., Rainey v. Walsh, 562 U.S. 1286 (2011) (No. 
42 
 
 
 Rather, we follow the ordinary rule that “the ultimate 
issue under either [the Strickland or Brecht] test reduces to 
determining what effect, if any, the erroneous instruction had 
on the jury’s verdict.”  Whitney, 280 F.3d at 258.  In making 
this determination, “[h]armless-error review looks . . . to the 
basis on which ‘the jury actually rested its verdict.’ . . . That 
must be so, because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was 
never in fact rendered—no matter how inescapable the 
findings to support that verdict might be—would violate the 
jury-trial guarantee.”  Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 
279 (1993) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original) (quoting 
Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 404 (1991)) (reviewing claim on 
direct appeal); see also United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 
U.S. 140, 150 (2006) (holding that the denial of the right to 
counsel of one’s choice is structural error not subject to 
harmlessness review because “[h]armless-error analysis in 
such a context would be a speculative inquiry into what might 
have occurred in an alternate universe”); Jones v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 373, 404 (1999) (evaluating for harmless 
error purposes what “the jury in this case actually 
understood”).  Accordingly, in Laird we rejected a Brecht 
harmless error argument because “we can not substitute 
ourselves for the jury by speculating about what portion of 
the testimony the jury believed.”  414 F.3d at 429; see also 2-
31 Randy Hertz & James S. Liebman, Federal Habeas 
Corpus Practice and Procedure § 31.4(d) (2017) (“The 
determinative consideration under the Brecht/Kotteakos 
standard thus is not the strength of the evidence or the 
probability of conviction at a hypothetical retrial absent the 
                                                                                                     
10-431), 2011 WL 663181, at *30 (alterations, emphasis and 
citation omitted).  We agree. 
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error,” but rather “whether the error substantially affected the 
actual thinking of the jurors or the deliberative processes by 
which they reached their verdict.”). 
 
 Thus, for the reasons above, we conclude that the 
Commonwealth waived the harmless error defense and that, 
even if the argument were preserved, the due process 
violation was not harmless.   
 
VI.   Conclusion 
 
 We will reverse the District Court’s order denying 
habeas corpus relief and remand with instructions to grant a 
conditional writ of habeas corpus as to Bennett’s conviction 
for first degree murder20 so that the matter may be returned to 
state court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.21 
                                              
 20  Under Laird, “[o]ur holding in no way undermines 
the jury’s guilty verdict on the remaining charges.”  Laird, 
414 F.3d at 430 n.9; see also Everett, 290 F.3d at 516 
(granting the writ “with regard to [the defendant’s] conviction 
for first degree murder”).   
  
 21  The Court acknowledges and thanks the Drexel 
University Appellate Litigation Clinic for the skillful pro 
bono advocacy provided to Mr. Bennett in this appeal. 
